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We explore three hitherto poorly understood characteristics of the human trafficking market – 
the cross-border ease of mobility of traffickers, the relative bargaining strength of traffickers 
and final buyers, and the elasticity of buyers’ demand. In a model of two-way bargaining, the 
exact configuration of these characteristics is shown to determine whether domestic and 
foreign crackdowns on illicit employment mutually reinforce or counteract one another in 
efforts to stem the tide of trafficking. Estimation results from a gravity model of trafficking 
present evidence consistent with the mutual reinforcement view, indicating considerable ease 
of mobility, partial bargaining power, and inelastic demand. 
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Transnational human tracking is one of the least studied forms of international movement in
persons. But what little is known about it suggests that it is a highly lucrative business. A recent
ILO report puts the total illicit prots produced each year by tracked laborers at US$31.7 billion,
and the estimated stock of forced labor due to tracking at 2.45 million (ILO 2005). Together
these gures imply a level of illicit prots per tracked person per year at close to US $13,000.
An overwhelming majority of tracked persons are women and girls, and sexual exploitation is
the most commonly identied form of proteering on tracked persons (US Department of State
2009).1 Matching worldwide demand with victims in this global trade in humans, recent research
shows that the perpetrators of tracking are driven primarily by local criminal networks in source
countries (UNODC 2009). This latest evidence based on painstakingly collected criminal justice
data worldwide reveal that some local networks in the source countries sell victims domestically to
feed domestic illicit demand, while others are directed internationally instead to service criminal
networks in destination countries, where diaspora population from the same source country are
frequently used as conduits.
These salient features of the market for illicit trade in humans uncovered to date { buyers'
demand driven exploitative employment that operates underground, and footloose middleman traf-
ckers with multiple possible buyer sources reaching across national borders { reveal two critical
though hitherto poorly understood sets of issues related to tracking policy design. First, with
possibly competing demand for tracked victims coming from both domestic and foreign sources,
how eective is a stand alone crackdown on domestic illicit activities that acts on domestic buyers'
willingness to pay, but leaves foreign demand untouched? Conversely what about stricter foreign
law enforcement, or victim protection programs such as an amnesty that facilitate discovery by
law enforcement in destination countries?
Next, the clandestine nature of the employment of tracked victims and the need to evade
law enforcement are conditions that foster underground bargaining and exchange rather than open
1The exploitative and involuntary nature of the employment, where the victims take no part of the illicit prot,
squarely sets human tracking apart from voluntary migration and human smuggling. Specically, the Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Tracking in Persons, especially Women and Children denes the crime of tracking
in human beings to mean \the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or
of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benets to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation".
1competition for the labor of victims. But the mere possibility of a departure from the competitive
frame means that the tracker may no longer partake in the full measure of buyers' willingness to
pay. Now the same set of questions concerning the eectiveness of a crackdown on illicit activities
take on sharply dierent meaning, for what is the tracking impact of a crackdown on illicit
activities in the source country if the bargaining position of footloose transnational trackers
hinges on a threat to switch to a domestic buyer source? Similarly, what about the case when
there is a similar hike in the likelihood of discovery in the foreign country?
These are the questions that guide the tasks set forth in this paper. Our goal is to contribute
to the debate on the choice and coordination of international eorts to curb transnational traf-
cking, by means of legislation that directly act on the demand side incentives of middlemen to
engage in tracking. The issue is of vital importance for a number of reasons. As set out in the
UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Tracking in Persons, signatory governments agree
to adopt legislative measures to discourage the demand that fosters the exploitation of persons
that leads to tracking. But whether a heightened likelihood of discovery in illicit service sectors
can in fact achieve this goal, and stem the tide of transnational tracking is a matter of vigorous
debate. The Tracking in Persons report (U.S. Department of State 2007) discusses the view in
favor of a crackdown on prostitution as follows:
\Sex tracking would not exist without the demand for commercial sex ourishing
around the world. The U.S. Government adopted a strong position against prostitution
in a December 2002 policy decision, which states that prostitution is inherently harmful
and dehumanizing and fuels tracking in persons. (pp. 27.)"
In sharp contrast, the Tracking in Human Beings report of the Dutch National Rapporteur
(Bureau of the Dutch National Rapporteur on Tracking 2005) notes:
\Opponents of the criminalisation of prostitution take the view that it is precisely this
that plays into the hands of the criminal networks... They feel that prostitution would
continue regardless, while at the same time sex workers would be stigmatised, crimi-
nalised or { because their clients could be prosecuted { marginalised because of a repres-
sive approach. (pp.7) ".
To date, the question of how victim protection and empowerment, as well as law enforcement
2against illicit activities ultimately impact trackers' incentives remains largely open due to a real
paucity in both theoretical and empirical research in the literature.
Apart from illicit trade in humans, the issues addressed here share many parallels with
other forms of illicit international trade in goods such as drugs, endangered species, and arms,
for example, and many of the lessons learned here for the case of tracking can be more broadly
applied to alternative forms of of illicit international trade. Closely related to our work, Becker,
Grossman and Murphy (2006) examines the eectiveness of law enforcement on the volume of illicit
drug activities in a competitive setting within a single country, and highlights the importance of
the elasticity of demand in determining the answer. Our analysis builds on and substantially adds
to the theoretical insights developed therein, and does so (i) theoretically by proposing a two-way
bargaining framework that enables us to better understand the negotiation problem of a footloose
tracker, and (ii) empirically by putting together a novel dataset that enables us to test the
implications of the model.
In the model, tracking arises rst and foremost as a consequence of middleman trackers'
response to buyers' willingness to pay in the source and the host countries. This willingness to
pay is taken to be endogenous, depending among other things on the likelihood of discovery and
work stoppage. We envisage two sets of policies as key determinants of these likelihoods: (i) victim
protection programs, such as an amnesty granted to tracked victims, and (ii) law enforcement
against prostitution. The former raises the likelihood of work stoppage by empowering victims
to access host country police authorities, and the latter achieves similar ends through direct law
enforcement.
Beyond willingness to pay, we pay particular attention to the possible implications of the
underground transaction between a tracker and a buyer, domestic or foreign. We do so by
expressing a footloose tracker's decision problem as a two-way bilateral Nash bargaining problem,
in which we allow for (i) a full range of possible relative bargaining strengths of the tracker in
both the source and the foreign countries, and (ii) heterogeneity among trackers in their ability
to switch between a domestic and a foreign buyer in the form of a search cost. Does a hike in the
likelihood of discovery on source country illicit activities oset or reinforce the tracking impact
of a similar crackdown in the foreign country?
Consistent with the message of Becker, Grossman and Murphy (2006), we nd that if buyer
3demand is inelastic, an increase in the likelihood of discovery in the destination country will raise
buyers' willingness to pay there, thus encouraging the inow of tracked victims. By contrast,
an increase in the likelihood of discovery in the source country will instead raise source country
buyer's willingness to pay, thus discouraging the outow of tracked victims. A priori, therefore,
source and destination crackdowns on illicit activities should be expected to have polar opposite
impacts on the incidence of transnational tracking, so long as middleman trackers are expected
to reap the full value of the buyer's willingness to pay in the destination and in the source country.
While integral, this is but a part of the story. Indeed, in our two-way bargaining setup, the
expected prot of a footloose tracker in the source country is shown to depend on his threat point
income { the expected prot of the same victim in the destination country, and vice versa. Thus,
we address the issue of the simultaneous endogeneity of the trackers' threat point bargaining
positions both at home and abroad, depending jointly on the conguration of host and source
country policies on illicit employment and victim protections.
The resulting setup illustrates clearly why international policy coordination in the presence
of footloose trackers can present a genuine challenge, requiring detailed information not just
on demand elasticity, but critically also on the the bargaining strength and cross-border reach
of the trackers. Indeed, we conclude our theoretical analysis by displaying altogether sixteen
distinctive congurations of market characteristics combinations wherein the eectiveness of source
and host policies on tracking can potentially raise, decrease, counteract, or mutually reinforce
each other. This allows for a systematic analysis of the rationale behind each conguration of
policy eectiveness. But more importantly, this also showcases an hitherto under-appreciated link
between policy eectiveness and the characteristics of the market for tracking. For example, we
show that source and host country law enforcement mutually reinforce each other in increasing the
transnational ow of tracked victims only in the presence of the following combination of market
characteristics: trackers who enjoyable considerable cross-border mobility but partial bargaining
strength, and a suciently inelastic buyer demand.
The empirical part of the paper accordingly takes these issues to the data, and employs a novel
187  187 matrix of the incidence of bilateral international tracking collected for the purpose
of this research (Basu and Chau 2008). We estimate a modied gravity model of international
tracking, and in so doing we simultaneously account for the push and pull forces of international
4tracking in determining the bilateral match between host and destination countries. We augment
a standard gravity model of international migration by including a measure of host country granting
of legal amnesty to discovered victims of tracking. After controlling for potential unobserved
heterogeneity and endogeneity based on a two-stage least squares regression, we nd that countries
which grant legal amnesty to immigrants have an increased likelihood of experiencing human
tracking. This empirical nding is robust to the use of several dierent instruments. We also
include prostitution laws in the host and the source countries in our estimation. Based on our
theoretical model, these empirical results are consistent with (i) inelastic nal buyers' demand and
(ii) partial bargaining power on the part of trackers and (iii) considerable cross-border reach in
trackers' ability to identify buyers.
Our modied gravity approach introduces a new dimension to a very small, but growing
literature on the empirics of tracking in humans. These studies have empirically examined the
pattern of tracking, using distinctive measures such as country level indicators respectively of
\out-tracking" and \in-tracking" (Bales 1999, Danilova-Tranior and Belser 2006), the incidence
of forced labor in illicit sectors to which tracking in persons belong as a subset (Busse and Braun
2002), and data from surveys of victims and families (Mahmoud and Trebesch 2010). These stud-
ies single out a list of factors that are associated with tracking: socio-economic and governance
indicators in both host and source countries such as poverty, unemployment and government cor-
ruption; the practice of migration for work in the source country; as well as trade and foreign
direct investment linkages. Clearly, much more remains to be uncovered concerning the sources in
particular of a bilateral match between source and destination countries of tracking, and the role
of source and destination country legislation directed towards the illicit sectors where victims are
ultimately employed.
A theoretical literature on the more general issue of exploitative labor and intermediaries
assisted migration also exists but is substantially thinner. Most closely related to our work dealing
with tracking policy formation, Rogers and Swinnerton (2008) provides theoretical justication
for a complete ban on exploitative labor, where employment is made possible only by the deception
of rms concerning the true nature of work. Friebel and Guriev (2006) examines the role of
deportation policies on debt-nanced illegal immigration in an innovative model where wealth
constrained individuals repay their debt to smugglers by entering into servitude contracts, and
5where such servitude contracts are easier to enforce in illicit sectors of employment. They show
the intriguing result that stricter border controls can in fact increase debt nanced migration
as smugglers respond to policy-induced change in the market value of a migrant by adjusting the
volume of smuggling. Our paper contributes to this growing literature by introducing a two-country
setup in which both domestic and transnational tracking are in the tracker's choice set, and
where the impact of legislation is shown to interact in important ways with the market structure
in which trackers operate.
2 The Basic Model
We consider a setting featuring the interactions between a buyer of the services of tracked victims
and a middleman tracker. Potential buyers originate from two sources, the domestic (source)
country illicit sector (d) and the foreign (host) country illicit sector (f), while middleman trackers
serve as intermediaries delivering tracked victims from source d to buyers in d and / or f.2
Let Vi denote the monetary equivalent buyer valuation of the services per victim in i = d;f.
Buyer willingness to pay depends on two sets of considerations that each individual buyer takes as
given: (i) the overall availability of victims in i, and (ii) the risk of buyer discovery and prosecution.
Each of these considerations depend critically on the likelihood of a crackdown on illicit employment
in d and f, along with the legal protection oered to transnational victims of tracking particularly
in f.3
Specically, in the domestic country d, enforcement of legislation outlawing illicit sector
employment, such as legislation banning prostitution, gives rise to a probability pd 2 [0;1] of
discovery and of buyer penalty cd  0. From the perspective of the overall availability of victims in
i, we specify Vi simply as a function of the likelihood that victims remain undiscovered, Vd(1 pd),
and assume that Vi() is positive and strictly decreasing in the perceived availability of victims in
1 pd, consistent with diminishing marginal utility. Turning to buyer discovery and prosecution, law
enforcement gives rise to a probability pd of work stoppage and of buyer penalty. The corresponding
2Our denition of illicit sector employment, whether domestic or foreign, is simply taken to be any work relation-
ships from which victims tracking can derive no benet.
3Other country specic reasons that govern the valuation of victims are taken to be embodied in the valuation
function Vi for each i. Our objective here in the model is to specically assess the role of law enforcement and victim
protection. In our empirical analysis, a battery of variables will be used to control other sources of heterogeneity of
Vi across countries.
6maximal willingness to pay per tracked victim is
(1   pd)Vd(1   pd)   pdcd:
In the foreign country f, the likelihood of discovery and of buyer penalty pf is made up
of two parts: the frequency of active law enforcement f as well as victim self-reporting af, with
pf = f +af. For example, many host countries formally provide protection and other assistance to
tracked victims through the granting of amnesty. We take the victim protection that an amnesty
confers { as opposed to a policy of indierence, or one which gives discovered tracked victims
the same legal status as an illegal immigrant for example { to contribute to raising the likelihood
of victim discovery from f to f + af 2 [0;1]. The corresponding maximal willingness to pay in
f is thus:
(1   pf)Vf(1   pf)   pfcf = (1   f   af)Vf(1   f   af)   (f + af)cf:
Denote i  0 as the cost required to capture and track a victim from d to work in i. The
net expected value generated per victim tracked, to be ultimately divided between the buyer and
the middleman tracker, is thus:
EVd  (1   pd)Vd(1   pd)   pdcd   d (1)
in d and
EVf  (1   f   af)Vf(1   f   af)   (f + af)cf   f
= (1   pf)Vf(1   pf)   pfcf   f (2)
in f.
Henceforth, denote i
j as the marginal impacts of policy j on the expected value EVi in the
illicit sector of country i. Of the ve policies, cd, cf, pd, f and af, the role of penalty ci is the most
straightforward. Since EVi decreases strictly with penalty ci, it follows that i
c must be strictly
negative as long as there is a strictly positive likelihood of discovery (pi > 0 ) in i = d;f from (1)
and (2).
Two opposite forces impact of the role of discovery frequencies (pd and pf = f + af) on
the net expected value. Working to decrease EVi, discovery directly leads to work stoppages and
nes. But in opposite direction, discovery also contributes to rising scarcity of workers in i, and
7thus the value per worker there Vi(). It follows that if the quantity demand for illicit workers is
suciently inelastic (j@ logVi=@ log(1   pi)j  1), the expected value of a victim rises with pd in d
and pf = f + af in f, or d
p > 0; f
 > 0; and f
a > 0.4
2.1 The Two-Way Bargaining Problem
Linking victims in d to buyers in d and / or f, consider a pool of heterogeneous middleman
trackers in the domestic country, with size normalized to one.5 All middleman trackers enjoy
direct cost-free contact with one domestic illicit buyer. Heterogeneity among middleman trackers
can be gauged along two dimensions: (i) their costs of foreign buyer access, and (ii) their reservation
income levels as fall back options in case they choose to refrain from tracking. Specically, we
parameterize the cross-border reach of a tracker by a search cost (k  0) required to solicit a
nal buyer in the foreign country. The reservation income of a tracker will be denoted as  y  0,
the forgone income of a tracker. Assume henceforth that the cumulative distribution function
characterizing the pool of heterogeneous middlemen on the two-dimensional (k;  y) plane is given
by G(k;  y), with density function g(k;  y)  0 for k  0 and  y  0.
The problem of a potential middleman tracker is two-staged. In the rst, he decides whether
or not to engage in tracking. If not, he earns his reservation income  y. Otherwise, a second stage
decision needs to be made about the choice between tracking destinations d and f.
Starting from the second stage, we take the clandestine nature of employment in illicit sectors
to naturally hinder open competition for tracked victims. Transaction between a buyer and
a tracker will accordingly be modeled as an outcome of two-way Nash bilateral bargaining.
Specically, the equilibrium incomes of a tracker delivering a victim to a buyer respectively in




[yd   (yf(k)   k)]
d [EVd   yd]
1 d (3)
yf(k)   k = maxfargmax
yf
[yf   yd(k)]
f [EVf   yf]
1 f   k; 0g (4)
taking as given host and source policies. (3) - (4) jointly highlight a number of notable features
of the two-way bargaining problem. First, yi and EVi   yi together divide the victim's expected
4Bales (2004) emphasizes the important role of the demand elasticity for tracked victims, discusses its determi-
nants, and provides arguments suggesting that demand for tracked victims in illicit sectors is likely inelastic.
5The symmetric problem of a middleman tracker based in the foreign country can be worked out as well. Other
than the positioning of the search cost, the analytics are identical to the case considered here.
8value (EVi) completely between the tracker and the buyer in i = d;f. The relative bargaining
strength of the middlemen in the exchange is parameterized by i 2 (0;1):
Next, (3) - (4) show that the domestic and foreign illicit markets are inextricably linked {
in (3) the threat point of a tracker operating domestically is the expected income that the same
tracker can anticipate in the foreign country yf(k)   k, while in (4) the threat point income of
the tracker in the foreign country is the expected income he can earn domestically yd(k). In
equilibrium, both threat points are endogenous, to be determined as the joint solutions to the
two-way bargaining problem in (3) - (4). The threat point income of the buyers in i in case an
agreement cannot be struck is normalized at zero.
Finally, note furthermore that in (3) and (4), trackers are free to quit at any point, and as
such yf(k)   k never falls below zero.
Gains from Transnational Tracking
The solution yf(k)   k to (3) - (4) gives the expected income from transnational tracking as
yf(k)   k = maxf(fEVf   k) + fdEVd; 0g; (5)
where  = 1=[1   (1   d)(1   f)], and f = (1   f). As shown, yf(k)   k depends on the
expected value of a victim in both d and f (EVd and EVf), in addition to the bargaining strength
of middlemen in d and f (d and f). From (1) and (2), these expected values EVi are in turn
dependent on law enforcement (pd and f), as well as on the degree victim protection accorded in
the form of an amnesty (af) in f.
Schedule Df in Figure 1 illustrates yf(k) k as the cross-border reach of trackers k varies,
for bargaining strengths of the tracker i anywhere in the interior of the range (0;1). Naturally,
Df is downward sloping as a higher search cost k decreases a tracker's income from transnational
tracking. For tracker immobility suciently acute, or k beyond b k  fEVf + (1   f)dEVd,
the search cost is too high to justify transnational tracking, and yf  k is thereafter equal to zero.
Gains from Domestic Tracking
Now, the other solution to (3) and (4) gives the expected income from domestic tracking yd(k):
yd(k) = maxfdEVd + d(fEVf   k);dEVdg (6)
9where  = 1=[1   (1   d)(1   f)], and d = (1   d). Like yf(k)   k, yd(k) depends on the
expected values of a victim both in d and f, in addition to the bargaining strengths d and f
of the middleman tracker. It follows from (1) and (2) that the extent of law enforcement in the
two countries (pd and f) and the availability of victim protection (af) will also enter into the
determination of the equilibrium income of a tracker engaged in domestic tracking, yd(k).
The Dd schedule in Figure 1 illustrates yd(k), evaluated at bargaining strengths of the mid-
dleman tracker i 2 (0;1), and assuming in addition that EVf > EVd for otherwise no tracker
will engage in international tracking.6 As shown, yd(k) decreases with search cost k, though at
a rate strictly less that the slope of yf(k) k with respect to k. Intuitively, the share of a victims'
value yd(k) that a domestic tracker commands depends in part on yf(k) k.7 Since the tracker's
threat point income in d, yf(k)   k, declines with the cost he must incur to switch between buyer
sources, the same tracker's command on the value of a victim in d likewise declines with k. This
continues until transnational tracking is no longer a feasible option at k  b k. Thereafter, further
increases in k has no impact on a domestic tracker's share of the value of a victim, since his threat
point income is zero for k  b k. Now, since trackers' type fall anywhere on the (k;  y) plane, how
many will prefer transnational tracking, domestic tracking, or no tracking in equilibrium?
2.2 Tracking Equilibrium with Two-Way Bilateral Bargaining
A tracking equilibrium with two-way bilateral bargaining is a combination ff;dg representing
the the number of trackers that engage respectively in transnational and domestic tracking.8
Specically, a tracker engages in transnational tracking if he belongs to area A of Figure 1,
where f(k;  yd)jyf(k) k = maxf y;yf(k) k;yd(k)gg. The cuto ~ k = f(EVf EVd) gives the search
cost of the marginal tracker who is indierent between transnational and domestic tracking, or
yf(~ k) ~ k = yd(~ k). Now, area B in Figure 1 illustrates the set of trackers that engage in domestic






g(k;  y)d ydk (7)
6The opposite case with EVd > EVf can be plotted in symmetric fashion in a gure like Figure 1. It can be easily
conrmed that if EVd > EVf, the Df schedule lies uniformly below the Dd schedule, and as such no trackers will
engage in international tracking.
7Indeed, yd(k) is as may be expected a weighted average of EVd and yf(k) k, or yd(k) = dEVd+(1 d)(yf(k) k)
from (3).











g(k;  y)d ydk: (8)
For potential trackers with (k;  y) neither in A, or B, the fall back option of  y is preferred. These
individuals do not engage in either domestic or transnational tracking.
We can now consider each of the policies, af, f, and pd in turn, and their eects on
transnational tracking. Supposing for now that buyers demand is suciently inelastic, and
thus f
a > 0;f
 > 0. In terms of foreign payos, a higher likelihood of discovery in the foreign
country (due either to victim protection af, or an increase in law enforcement f) raises a victims
value EVf in f, raises the tracker's share yf(k)   k from (6), and accordingly shifts the Df
schedule upwards. In terms of domestic payos, a higher yf(k)   k raises the threat point income
of a domestic tracker, and shifts Dd upwards as well since yd(k) increases with EVf from (7).
The combined impacts on transnational tracking are two-fold. First, stronger foreign demand
induced by stricter enforcement abroad raises the likelihood of transnational tracking by raising
the cuto reservation income yf(k)   k among trackers with an already low search cost (< ~ k).
This encourages transnational tracking among those who previously prefer the fall back option  y.
Second, the same increase in foreign demand also raises the cuto search cost, ~ k = f(EVf  EVd)
with i > 0. This encourages transnational tracking among those who previously prefer domes-
tic tracking. Taken together, foreign legislation that raises the demand for tracked victims
unambiguously increase the likelihood of transnational tracking, f.
Consider instead an increase in law enforcement in the domestic country pd. Assuming once
again that demand is suciently inelastic (d
p > 0), stricter domestic enforcement raises a victim's
domestic value EVd, raises the tracker's share yd(k), and accordingly shifts the Dd upwards. This
discourages domestic tracking among some who would otherwise prefer transnational tracking
as the cut o search cost ~ k = f(EVf   EVd) moves to the left with domestic law enforcement.
Due to by now familiar reasoning, stricter domestic enforcement also raises the tracker's share
of EVf in the foreign country as their threat point income yd(k) is now higher. This encourages
transnational tracking among those with k  b k who would otherwise prefer the fall back option.
These two eects run in opposite directions, and the net eect depends on whether there is su-
cient probability mass among trackers with low search cost for the threat point income eect to
11dominate, for example. To gauge the size of these two eects, denote:
k
f =
Z yf(~ k) ~ k
0
g(~ k;  y)d y
as the probability mass of trackers with the cuto search cost ~ k. These are the rst trackers to








as the probability mass among transnational trackers with the threshold reservation income
yf(k)   k, summing across all those with search cost less than the cuto. These are trackers
with suciently low search cost k but relatively high reservation income, and as such the rst
to engage in foreign tracking when a hike in the value of domestic tracking raises the threat
point income of foreign trackers. The relative size of these two groups of trackers determine
the impact of domestic legislation on transnational tracking. In what follows, we say that on net,





Proposition 1 For all i 2 (0;1), transnational tracking f rises with amnesty af and law
enforcement f if and only if foreign buyer demand is suciently inelastic (f
a > 0;f
 > 0).
Transnational tracking f rises with domestic law enforcement pd as well if and only if buyer
demand is suciently inelastic d
p > 0, and when trackers enjoy considerable ease of mobility







f(1   (1   d)(1   f))
d(1   f)
  :
Suciently inelastic demand, and tracker mobility facilitated by extensive cross-border buyer
connection are thus two key conditions for foreign and domestic law enforcement policies to mutu-
ally reinforce one another in expanding the scale of transnational tracking.
Proposition 1 oers sharp empirical implications, summarized in Table 1A for the case of suf-
ciently inelastic demand, and in Table 1B for all other demand elasticities. First, consistent with

















and the second part of the proposition straightforwardly follows.
12Becker, Grossman and Murphy (2006), Tables 1A and B together demonstrate that the elasticity
of demand is paramount. An increase in the incidence of transnational tracking subsequent to
improvements in the frequency of discovery f +af in f is consistent only with suciently inelastic
demand, while a reduction in the incidence of transnational tracking is consistent with all other













Second, whether domestic and foreign law enforcement are found to be mutually reinforcing
or run opposite to one another can shed light on the cross-border reach of middlemen trackers.
In particular, law enforcement against illicit sector activities in host (f) and source (pd) countries
that mutually reinforce one another in encouraging transnational tracking is consistent only with
trackers that enjoy considerable ease of mobility between host and source countries. This is shown
in Table 1A where both pd and f + af are both shown to have negative impacts on tracking
ows, and in Table 1B where both f and pd are shown to have positive impacts on tracking
ows. In all other cases, the eects of f + af and pd on transnational tracking bear opposite
signs.
2.3 Extensions of the Basic Model
Before we proceed to a discussion of the empirical implications of the model, consider two exten-
sions. Respectively, these extensions relax our assumptions on (i) the relative bargaining strength
of the tracker, and (ii) buyer consequences of whether discovery is accomplished by direct law
enforcement, or victim self-reports.
Full tracker bargaining power
Let us depart from the two-way bargaining problem discussed so far, and consider instead two
alternative scenarios. In the rst, the middleman tracker exercises fully his monopoly power and
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer to the buyer equaling the expected value of the victim respectively
in the two countries. In the second scenario, the tracker operates in a competitive environment,
in which the price of a victim's services is valued at its expected marginal value product. These
are in fact special cases of (5) and (6), upon attributing full bargaining power d = f = 1 to the
middleman tracker. Thus, the tracker receives as payment the full measure of buyer valuation
for a tracked in country i, amounting to (1   pd)Vd(1   pd)   pdcd in d, and (1   f   af)Vf(1  
13f   af)   (f + af)cf in f.
Accounting for the cost of tracking i and the mobility cost k in case of transnational
tracking, these alternative scenarios give rise to tracker incomes equaling
yf(k)   k = maxfEVf   k;0g and yd(k) = EVd: (9)
respectively in f and d. The rest of the analysis thus follows seamlessly, and the corresponding
policy comparative statics are shown in Tables 2A - B.
Clearly, with full bargaining strength i = 1, there is no room left for the threat point income
of the tracker to further contribute to tracker income in either d or f. This simple observation
has powerful policy implications. As shown in (9), full tracker bargaining power severs the link
between the trackers income in f, and enforcement policies in d, pd. This is shown in Figure 2,
where yd(k) is now a straight line, and independent of the search cost k.
Full tracker bargaining power furthermore severs the critical link between the transnational
tracking response to source country policies and the cross-border mobility of trackers discussed
earlier in Tables 1A and 1B. Instead as shown in Tables 2A and B, the comparative statics of
transnational tracking depends only on the elasticity of buyers demand. Intuitively, when changes
in source country policies can no longer impact the income of foreign trackers, the ability to switch
from one buyer to the next is likewise irrelevant in the determination of a tracker's income in f.
Consequently, with full tracker market power (i = 1), domestic and foreign country law
enforcement activities will never produce mutually reinforcing changes on transnational tracking
ows. Quite the contrary, with suciently inelastic buyer demand, for example, foreign enforce-
ment raises a tracker's income abroad, while domestic enforcement raises a tracker's income
domestically, implying that the combined impact of simultaneously strengthening enforcement in
the two countries will have an ambiguous impact on transnational tracking. For all other demand
elasticities, the impact of enforcement policies are simply reversed, and the implied combined im-
pact of simultaneously strengthening enforcement in the two countries on transnational tracking
continues to be ambiguous.
Policy-Specic Buyer Penalties
We now depart now from the earlier assumption that any type of victim discovery (whether self-
reported, or driven by law enforcement) leads directly to successful buyer prosecution. Instead,
14with primary purpose focusing mainly on victim protection, it may be the case that self-reporting
of victims facilitated through amnesty is less likely to secure buyer prosecution, or the imposition
of nes. Consider therefore as a variant of (2), the case where the expected surplus per tracked
victim in f is
EVf = (1   f   af)Vf(1   f   af)   fcf   f (10)
where the imposition of nes on buyers only apply when discovery is made via direct law enforce-
ment, and not via self-reporting facilitated by amnesty.
Consistent with our conclusions so far, the foreign expected value of a tracked victim will
rise with f if the quantity demand for illicit workers is suciently inelastic (j@ log(Vf)=@ log(1  
pf)j  1), f
 > 0. But with amnesty, since an increase in af no longer imposes the added cost
of buyer penalty, it can be readily veried amnesty raises the value EVf (f
a > 0) if and only if
quantity demand is inelastic (j@ log(Vf)=@ log(1   pf)j > 1).
The corresponding comparative statics responses of transnational tracking to the three
policies af, f, and pd are summarized in Tables 3A - D. Here we accommodate for all sixteen
cases, allowing for (i) buyers demand that may be elastic, suciently inelastic, or somewhere in
between, (ii) tracker bargaining strengths ranging from full to partial, (iii) relatively mobile,
and immobile trackers across the two countries, and (iv) the possibility of policy-specic buyer
penalty.
As may be expected, introducing this complication will give rise to divergent transnational
tracking responses to amnesty af and foreign law enforcement f particularly in the presence of
intermediate demand elasticities. Specically, with elastic or suciently inelastic demand, raising
the likelihood of discovery either through amnesty or foreign law enforcement will respectively
decrease or increase the value of a tracked victim in the foreign country. With intermediate
demand elasticity, however, an amnesty raises the value of a tracked victim as they become scarce
with discovery, but foreign law enforcement by contrast tends to lower the value of a tracked
victim as the likelihood of a ne increases. Tables 3C and 3D highlight the additional nuances in
the comparative statics that this extension brings to the model.
2.4 Empirical Implications
Tables 1 - 3 show in full view the diculties that arise with attempts to coordinate an interna-
tional response to mitigate against transnational tracking. Clearly, information about demand
15elasticity, tracker bargaining power, and tracker mobility across countries, are all key to the
design of such an international response. In what follows, the aim of our empirical investigation
is precisely to get a handle on these vital characteristics of the market for tracking that are by
nature dicult to directly estimate or proxy for. Our approach is to associate observed tracking
responses to policies in d and f to the relevant combination of demand elasticity, tracker bar-
gaining power, and tracker mobility based on Tables 1 - 3. But before we take our comparative
statics predictions to the data, there are two sets of issues to consider.
Identication
The rst issue concerns whether it is possible to identify the precise combination of demand elas-
ticity, tracker bargaining power, and ease of tracker mobility across countries based on the
comparative statics results alone. From Tables 1 - 3, which include in successive stages, the basic
model, the rst extension incorporating full tracker bargaining power, and then the second ex-
tension furthermore incorporating policy-specic buyer penalty, there are two consistent messages
that run throughout, regardless of whether buyer penalty happens to be policy-specic or not:
1. all three policies mutually reinforce each other in inuencing international tracking ows
only if (i) there is signicant tracker mobility across countries, and (ii) middleman tracker
enjoys only partial bargaining power,
2. given (i) and (ii) are met, demand elasticity come into play in determining the direction
of the impact of all three policies on transnational tracking. Specically, all three policies
encourage tracking if demand is suciently inelastic, and discourage tracking for all other
demand elasticities.
It follows, therefore, that regardless of the policy specicity of buyer penalties, there are two pos-
sible sets of comparative statics responses (fNeg., Neg., Neg.g, fPos., Pos., Pos.g) that are each
consistent with a unique combination of demand elasticity, tracker bargaining power, and ease of
tracker mobility. In both cases, trackers face partial bargaining power, and signicant ease of
tracker mobility. With positive tracking response to af, f and pd, the implication is thus that
buyer demand is suciently inelastic. With negative tracking responses to these same policies,
all other elasticities with the exception of suciently inelastic demand apply.
16Measurement
The second issue concerns the measurement of tracked victims. By necessity, observed tracking
ow represent the number of discovered victims either through law enforcement, or self-reporting,
rather than the actual magnitude of the number of tracked victims. In the context of our model,
denote observed transnational tracking as obs
f :
obs





g(k;  y)d ydk
where f to recall is the actual number of tracked victims, and af+f denote the probability that
an individual cross-border tracked victim will be discovered. Our comparative statics exercises
presented in Tables 1 - 3 are concerned with the impact of the three policies on actual tracking











= f + (af + f)
@f
@f




= (af + f)
@f
@pd
for domestic (source) country initiated policy pd.
It follows, then, that comparative statics of observed ows with respect to foreign policies may
falsely represent the direction of the comparative statics of actual ows. Intuitively, an increase in
the likelihood of discovery can generate an increase in the observed ow of (discovered) tracked
victims, even when the total number of tracked victims has declined.
The only exception to this complication is if the comparative statics are evaluated at the
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where the direction of the comparative statics response based on observed ows is the same as that
of the actual ow. Evaluated at f ! 0, Tables 1 - 3 are thus applicable to both the actual ow
of tracked victims, and the observed ow of tracked victims. In the ensuing empirical analysis,
it is indeed this extensive margin that we will focus on.
173 Data on Human Tracking
A paucity of reliable and comparable data has been a key factor hindering research on the forces
that determine international tracking. Research on the topic has so far been based primarily on
information gathered from victims of tracking.10 While yielding valuable insights, these studies
have a supply-side orientation that is not amenable to analysis of demand-side factors in host
countries of tracking, whether economic, demographic, legislative, or governance related, let
alone the characteristics of the market of tracking highlighted in Section 2.
For this paper, we compiled a dedicated dataset based on the Tracking in Persons (TIP)
Report (US Department of State 2003), and The Protection Project (TPP) Country Report (2002).
In terms of a global picture of the incidence of tracking, the TIP and the TPP are the two most
extensive collections of cross-country tracking information to the best of our knowledge. The TIP
report provides extensive qualitative information on host and source countries of tracking based
on reports published in host countries, and only for those host countries where at least 100 cases
of tracking have been discovered in the past year summing across all source countries identied
for each host. The TPP report details tracking routes as well as laws and legislation surrounding
tracking and prostitution in every country.11
We combed through the sizeable and extensive country-by-country descriptive accounts in
the TIP and the TPP reports to obtain two sets of information for each country. These are,
rst, whether a country is a host country of tracking, a source, both (a tracking hub), or
neither.12 Second, for each country we identify its tracking links. For reasons discussed in detail
10For example, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) has collected data since 1999 from persons
assisted under the IOM's counter-tracking programs. These data from the Counter-Tracking Module Database
(CTM) of the IOM primarily cover tracking originating from the Balkans (Salt 2005). More recently, a unique
data set has been collected by the ILO's Special Action Programme to Combat Forced Labour (SAP-FL). Based
on questionnaires from 160 returned migrants in four origin countries (Albania, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine),
interviews with informants, focus group discussions and research in seven destination countries (France, Germany,
Hungary, Japan, Russia, Turkey and United Kingdom), the SAP-FL database contains 298 entries of forced labor of
which 186 are tracked victims (see Andrees and van der Linden, 2005). Most recently, a study by Mahmoud and
Trebesch (2010) analyzes IOM data from 5513 households in Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania and Ukraine and
shows that migrant families in migration areas and with larger migrant networks are much more likely to be a victim
of tracking.
11Copies of the annual U.S. Department of State, Tracking in Persons Reports can be found at http://www.
state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/. The specic report that we use to construct our data base covers the period April
2002 to March 2003. The Protection Project Report is published by The Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies and the 2002 report provides information on legislation pertaining to tracking and
prostitution for the year 2002.
12We use the year 2002 as a cuto, for our data on legislation on tracking and prostitution from the Protection
Project Report pertains to that year. Furthermore, since 2003, a wave of national level legislative reforms to
18in Section 2, we focus on the extensive margin of tracking. We do so by constructing a binary
variable \trackhs", for all potential host-source country pairs. The variable takes on a value of
\1" if tracking from country s to country h has been reported, and \0" otherwise. The data
in these reports is certainly not comprehensive and clearly unreported cases of tracking are not
accounted for. Nevertheless, it does contain information to support an analysis of broad patterns
of tracking and represents a rst attempt at systematically using available information to analyse
the interaction between host and source country legislation and incentives of trackers.
Table 4 lists the 187 countries included in our data and their location in the four-part tax-
onomy: of the 187 countries in our dataset, 42 countries are identied as source, 45 as hosts, 66 as
hubs (or transit countries that act as both source and host) while 44 countries have no reported
incidence of tracking. To shed further light on the characteristics of the countries falling in each
category, Table 5 provides category specic information on a few key characteristics. All economic
and demographic variables are taken from World Bank (2004) for the year 2000. All legislative and
law enforcement related variables are taken from the TPP report. Furthermore, variables capturing




Our objective in what follows is to identify the push and pull factors which drive transnational traf-
cking while paying close attention to the eect of two key policy-relevant variables - host country
victim protection through amnesty and host and source country legislation against prostitution, a
crackdown on international tracking has reportedly taken place in response to the UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Tracking in Persons (UNODC 2009). According to UNODC (2009),
\most legislative frameworks on tracking in persons have been developed only within the last few
years... The UN Protocol entered into force in December 2003. The data shows that the majority of
countries did not have any sort of tracking in persons legislation prior to that year and that most of
the current laws criminalizing human tracking were established after 2003. (p. 22)"
While these developments since 2003 raise intriguing empirical questions, we do not have access to information on
the legislative reforms carried out at the individual country level since 2003.
13The \rule of law" indicator is a composite index of voice and accountability; political and stability; government
eectiveness; regulatory framework; rule of law and control of corruption. The indicator ranges from -3 (worst) to
+3 (best).
19sector which constitutes a lion's share of employment for tracked victims.14
To identify the drivers of cross-border tracking we propose to estimate a modied gravity
model. Such models have been widely used to examine trade ows and international migration.
In its simplest form, in the migration context, a gravity model species international migration
ows between an origin and a destination country as a function of income and population in
both locations and some measure of the physical distance between countries.15 Both origin and
destination country characteristics are included to control for the push and pull factors that drive
the migration decision.
Drawing on this established literature, we specify and estimate an augmented gravity model.
The outcome variable in our tracking ow model is a measure of whether there is any reported
incidence of human tracking from country s (source) to h (host). Following the standard approach
we specify tracking as a function of per capita GDP (PCGDP) in both the host and the source
country. To capture the cost of tracking, we include a distance variable, a measure of whether
countries share a common border, and whether they are in a common region of the world.
In addition to the inclusion of distance, common region and common border eects we include
other region specic measures which may have a bearing on tracking ows. These include for
both host and source countries a variable indicating whether the country is a transition economy
(from socialist towards market-based economy), whether the country is land-locked and a set of
regional xed eects. Following some of the migration literature (Borjas 1987, Karemara et al.
2000), we furthermore include a set of variables that reect host and country political conditions.
These are, variables which capture rule of law, political stability and voice and accountability in
both host and source countries.
Finally, and most importantly, we include whether host and source countries have laws ban-
ning prostitution, and whether they have laws which allow for the granting of amnesty to tracked
victims. Whether a country grants amnesty indicates that a country does not treat victims of
tracking in violation of immigration law and subject to deportation, but oers them temporary
or permanent residency status. The presence of host (source) country laws banning prostitution
14A recent study conducted by the United Nations Oce of Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2009, p. 51) shows that
based on information provided by 52 countries, an overwhelming majority (79%) of the reported incidences of human
tracking involve sexual exploitation.
15Papers which employ the gravity model in the immigration context include Sjaastad (1962), Greenwood (1975),
Borjas (1987, 1989), and Karemera et al (2000).
20is the empirical counterpart for f (pd), and legal provisions allowing for amnesty is the empirical
counterpart of af. We expect that countries which have laws banning prostitution are more likely
to enforce laws related to tracking (at least of women). While it is quite likely that there is a
gap between legislation and enforcement in the absence of actual information on law enforcement
activities, the use of laws banning prostitution as a proxy for law enforcement related to prostitu-
tion, given that it is a sector that account for the bulk of tracked victims' employment, does not
seem unreasonable.
The complete augmented gravity specication may be written as:
Trackhs = PCGDPh(s) + Distancehs + Common Region + Common Border
+Regionh(s) + Political Conditionsh(s)
+Grants Legal Amnestyh + Bans Prostitutionh(s) + hs: (11)
By way of interpretation, our earlier discussion of Tables 1 - 3 will be used to serve as a
guide on the lessons that will be drawn from the observed association between the three policies
and Trackhs. Thus, what combination of buyer demand elasticity, tracker bargaining strength,
and tracker ease of mobility is consistent with the observed empirical association between \Grant
Legal Amnestyh" and Trackhs, and between \Bans Prostitutionh(s)" and Trackhs?
4.2 Econometric Concerns and Estimation
Since Trackhs is a binary variable, assuming that hs is normally distributed we begin by estimat-
ing several single-equation probit specications of (11). Given that the main aim of the empirical
work is to characterize the market for tracking by examining the eects of amnesty in a host
country and the eect of host and source country prostitution laws (as proxies for law enforcements
with regard to tracking), a relevant econometric concern is whether these three policy related
measures and tracking ows are simultaneously determined. While laws pertaining to prostitu-
tion are less likely to be directly linked to tracking ows, our main concern is about the amnesty
variable as it is probably the variable which is most susceptible to a two-way relationship. That is,
a country may be more likely to grant amnesty if it experiences a large inow of tracking rather
than tracking ows being driven by the provision of amnesty.
An additional but related concern is that since we are using a single cross-section of data and
cannot control for country specic unobserved heterogeneity which may inuence tracking ows
21and laws we may obtain biased estimates of the eect of amnesty provision and prostitution related
laws on tracking. For example, unobserved country specic characteristics and values such as
tolerance and openness may inuence tracking ows and may also exert an eect on whether a
country provides amnesty. Also, the composition of the pattern of exploitation (e.g. forced labor,
sexual exploitation) inicted on tracked victims may also dier, and as such the relevance of law
enforcement on specic illicit sectors of employment (e.g. prostitution) can dier across countries.
We adopt a range of estimation approaches in view of these econometric concerns.
Unobserved Country Values
An obvious approach to account for unobserved heterogeneity would be to use panel data and
allow for country xed eects. However, such data are not readily available and even if they were,
considering that amnesty and prostitution related variables are unlikely to display much variation
over time, access to panel data is unlikely to aid identication of the eect of such laws on track-
ing. As an alternative, in addition to the inclusion of the country specic socio-political conditions
in (11), to account for typically unobserved country values which may inuence tracking ows
and the policy-relevant variables of concern we estimate specications which control for \distaste
for foreign neighbors" and a country's views on prostitution.16 These data are obtained from the
World Values Survey, a source which claims to provide a country-level representative assessment of
values and outlook of the residents in various countries (European Values Study Group and World
Values Survey Association 2006).
Diverse Patterns of Exploitation
The next issue concerns the potentially diverse nature of tracking subsumed under the binary
variable \Trackhs". While transport of women and children for the purpose of sexual exploita-
tion is the predominant reason for tracking (UNODC 2009), other forms of tracking, such as
forced labor and other forms of exploitation, are also known to exist. Arguably, as long as sexual
exploitation is among one of the reasons for tracking, we would expect laws banning prostitution
16The question on tolerance of foreign neighbors is: \On this list are various groups of people. Could you please
sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?" A positive response is recorded as the number one, while
a no response is recorded as a zero. The question for the justiability of prostitution is: Please tell me for each of
the following statements whether you think it can always be justied, never be justied, or something in between.
A ten point scale is given with 1 equal to never justiable and 10 equal to always justiable.
22to play a role, for example. Nonetheless, we make use of information just recently made available
(UNODC 2009) on regional variations in the patterns of exploitation. Specically, among Western
and Central African countries, forced labor is reportedly a major form of tracking, though traf-
cking for sexual exploitation is also observed. Among East African countries, information about
the pattern of exploitation is scarce and largely unknown. In all other regions, sexual exploitation
is reportedly the predominant form of tracking. To see the potential impact that these dier-
ences in patterns of exploitation on our estimates, we sequentially exclude countries with unknown
patterns of exploitation, and / or known patterns of exploitation that are largely not related to
sexual exploitation.
Endogeneity and Credibility of Instruments
Next, to allow for the possible endogeneity between tracking ows and amnesty we adopt an
instrumental variable (IV) approach and provide several IV estimates of (11). We endogenize
amnesty and treat it as a function of explanatory variables that are listed in (11) and a set of
variables that are assumed to determine amnesty but are assumed not to have a direct bearing on
tracking (excluded from the tracking equation). Following Vella (1993) we obtain generalized
residuals from a rst-stage probit regression of amnesty which are subsequently, inserted in (11).
This augmented probit equation provides consistent estimates and a test of the null hypothesis
that the coecients on the generalized residuals are zero is a (Hausman) specication test for the
exogeneity of amnesty.
While the estimation methodology is straightforward a key concern while implementing IV
is the availability of credible instruments. To estimate the impact of amnesty on tracking we
need variables that are correlated with the probability that a country grants amnesty but which,
conditional on other controls, do not exert an eect on tracking ows, other than through their
eect on amnesty provisions. There are several sets of potentially relevant instruments.
In recent years, a large body of literature has shown that a country's legal origins have a
direct bearing on its legal framework in several spheres and through these laws on economic and
social outcomes.17 More specically, LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998) use a country's legal origins as
17For more details on the link between legal origins and laws in dierent spheres including labor laws, company
and security law see LaPorta et al. (2008). For the link between legal origins and constitutional commitments to
education, health, housing and worker's rights see Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008).
23an instrument for its legal rules to identify the eect of laws on outcomes of interest. Taking a cue
from this literature we argue that laws regarding amnesty are likely to be inuenced by a country's
legal origins but are unlikely to exert a direct eect on tracking patterns. While laws do evolve,
the legal origin theory argues that the origins of a legal system continue to exert a substantial
inuence on its current legal system and that each legal system is marked by an \ideology, that is,
a religious or political conception of how economic or social life should be organized" (Zweigert and
Kotz, 1998, p.72). Following Reynolds and Flores (1989) each country in our data set is classied
into one of ve groups (Socialist, English common law, and civil law which is further divided
into French, Scandinavian and German origin) and subsequently the set of variables indicating a
country's legal origins are used to instrument amnesty.
While it is quite likely that a country's legal origins are correlated with the probability
that it grants amnesty, the exclusion restriction that legal origins do not have a direct bearing
on tracking ows may be challenged. If legal origins are viewed as a general indicator of how
economic and social life should be organized then these instruments may capture country-level
unobserved attitudes such as openness or tolerance and may indeed have a direct bearing on
tracking ows. We adopt two approaches to examine the extent to which our estimates may
be driven by such omitted variables. First, we estimate several IV models including specications
which control for a number of variables which are likely to be correlated with tracking ows
and legal origin. These include measures of the rule of law, voice and accountability, and political
stability. Of course it is not possible for us to control for all variables that might be correlated
with legal origins and tracking ows, hence in addition to these sensitivity checks we examine the
validity of the instruments by using an overidentication test. To implement the test we use the
mortality rate of European settlers in colonies between the seventeenth and the nineteenth century
as an additional instrument for amnesty. This variable has been used most famously by Acemoglu
et al. (2000, 2001) to instrument institutions and is based on the argument that colonies with
high rates of settler mortality were less attractive for European settlers and hence less likely to
have developed institutions conducive to economic development. Drawing a parallel we argue that
countries with high settler morality rates are less like to have developed the legal infrastructure and
institutions that would allow for the granting of amnesty to tracked people. For instance, in a
country with high settler mortality there would be little need for strong immigration and amnesty
24legislation.18
5 Regression Results
5.1 Single Equation Estimates
Single equation estimates of several variants of (11) are provided in Table 6. The rst specica-
tion includes only the key variables of interest (amnesty and prostitution laws) while subsequent
specication expands the model to include additional regressors. Specication 2 includes GDP
and distance related measures, while specication 3 controls additionally for landlocked and tran-
sitional economies. Specication 4 includes measures to control for regional xed eects, while
specications 5 and 6 include controls for country specic social and political conditions, respec-
tively without and with regional xed eects.
Focusing on the key variables of interest, as shown in the table, regardless of the specication,
the estimates indicate that the granting of amnesty by a host country is statistically signicant and
positively associated with tracking ows. The marginal eect ranges from 0.8 (column 4) to 5.7
(column 1) percentage points and while the inclusion of various regressors reduces the magnitude
of the coecient, it remains remarkably stable across specications. Except for specication 1
which includes only the key policy-relevant variables, the magnitude of the coecient lies between
between 0.8 and 1.5 percentage points. Across the board we see that there is a positive link between
host country amnesty provision and tracking ows suggesting is not associated with a decrease
in the probability of discovery (cost of tracked individuals) does not hinder tracking ows.
In terms of laws prohibiting prostitution, the estimates are also stable across specications
and display a positive link between host country prostitution laws and the probability of tracking.
However, the estimates are small in magnitude and are not statistically signicant. Similarly,
the coecients on source country prostitution laws are also positive, small and not statistically
signicant at conventional levels. Notwithstanding their insignicance both sets of laws have a
positive sign indicating that increases in law enforcement related to illicit sector activities in both
host and source countries mutually reinforce one another and are likely to increase rather than
decrease tracking ows.
18The European settler mortality rate dened in terms of deaths per thousand is available for 73 countries. It
is based on the mortality rates of soldiers, bishops and sailors working in various colonies over the 17th and 19th
centuries. For more details see Acemoglu et al. (2001). Since the measure of settler mortality is computed in the
19th century it should have no bearing on current tracking ows except through the endogenous variable.
25In light of the discussion in section 2 and Tables 1-3, the estimates related to amnesty
and prostitution laws jointly support the idea that the market for transnational tracking is
characterized by inelastic demand, partial tracker bargaining power, and that middlemen have
access to an internationally diverse buyer base and are able to readily switch between domestic
and foreign markets.
Appendix Table 1 displays single regression estimates after controlling for potential unob-
served heterogeneity in country values towards foreign neighbors and towards prostitution. To
account for the potentially diverse forms of exploitation subsumed under \Trackhs" Appendix
Tables 2, 3 and 4 successively exclude East African countries,19 Western and Central African coun-
tries,20 and both East, Western and Central African countries. While the number of observations
is greatly reduced in some cases, the resulting estimates are evidently quite robust, and uniformly
display a positive link between amnesty, source country prostitution laws, and host country pros-
titution laws on tracking. With these observations, in what follows we will return to the full
sample in order to carry out instrumental variable estimations.
5.2 Instrumental Variable Estimates
Tables 7a, 7b and 7c, present IV estimates (6 specications in each table) based on dierent sets
of instrument. The estimates in Table 7a are based on the use of legal origins as an instrument,
Table 7b is based on the use of settler mortality as an instrument while Table 7c uses both. The
rst stage estimates corresponding to each of the IV estimates is provided in columns 1 to 3 of
Appendix Table 5.
Before turning to the second-stage estimates a few comments on the rst stage estimates, in
particular, the strength of the instruments is in order. Column 1 shows that countries with French
or German legal origin as opposed to countries with other legal origins are more likely to provide
amnesty. The greater likelihood of amnesty provisions in countries with a civil law tradition is
consistent with the ndings of Ben-Bassat and Dahan (2008) who nd that countries with a civil
law tradition tend to have a higher constitutional commitment to social rights as compared to
countries with a common law tradition. Jointly and individually, the two legal origin variables are
statistically signicant and a joint statistical test for excluding the instruments records a p-value of
19These include Burundi, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda.
20These include Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo
26less than 0.01. Column 2 estimates which are based on settler mortality as an instrument show that
countries which recorded higher rates of settler mortality are less likely to grant amnesty. Although,
data on this measure is available for a smaller set of countries, the instrument is statistically
signicant and records a p-value of less than 0.01. In column 3 both instruments are statistically
signicant although the sign of the legal origin variable ips. Nevertheless, the requirement that
the instruments should be (highly) correlated with amnesty holds across all three specications.21
Table 7a provides IV estimates based on legal origins as an instrument. Table 7b is based
on settler mortality as an instrument, and Table 7c uses both legal origin and settler mortality as
instruments. Results in Table 7a show that the generalized residual is not statistically signicant
and that there is no need to endogenize amnesty. However, in the rst column of Table 7b and all
except one specication in Table 7c the term is negative and statistically signicant indicating that
in the absence of this correction there would be a tendency to underestimate the eect of amnesty
on tracking. Consistent with this, the IV estimates of amnesty in Tables 7b and 7c are positive,
statistically signicant and larger than their single equation counterparts.
As in the case of the single equation estimates, both host and source country prostitution
laws exert a positive and mutually reinforcing eect on international tracking. The main change
here is that these eects are now statistically signicant, and uniformly so in specications 4 and
6 where regional xed eects are included. This change is not due to an increase in the magnitude
of the coecient which still remains small, but due to the increased precision with which the
coecient is measured.
Overall, qualitatively there is not much dierence between the single equation and IV esti-
mates. In both cases and across a variety of specications there is a positive, large and statistically
signicant eect of amnesty on tracking ows. Across our empirical analysis, the eects of both
host and source country prostitution laws remain positive and small and the coecients on these
variables are statistically signicant when both legal origins and settler mortality are used as in-
strument, upon controlling for regional xed eects.
Based on these estimates, our empirical ndings is consistent with the co-existence of the
21Following Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002), the strength of the instruments may be gauged by examining the F-
statistic on the instruments in the rst stage. In order to do so we estimated the rst stage regression using a linear
probability model. In all three cases the rst stage F-statistics were substantially higher than the benchmark of 10 for
two-stage least squares to be reliable. To examine the validity of the instruments we conducted an overidentication
test using linear probability models. The test statistic recorded a p-value of 0.919 indicating that the null hypothesis
that the instruments are not correlated with the error term in the equation of interest cannot be rejected.
27following sets of characteristics of the market for tracking:
1. buyer valuation exhibit a suciently inelastic demand, suggesting that stricter enforcement
will raise the market value of tracked victims;
2. middleman trackers do not have full bargaining power, and as such the gains from tracking
depends at least in part on the bargaining position of the tracker. This implies that law
enforcement targeting tracked victims in the domestic source (foreign host) country can cast
a non-trivial impact on the bargaining outcome in foreign host (domestic source) countries,
and
3. middleman trackers exhibit a considerable degree of cross-border mobility. With (1) and
(2), the addition of (3) suggests that domestic and foreign law enforcement activities in
illicit sectors of employment tend to have a positive, and mutually reinforcing impact on the
incidence of transnational tracking.
6 Conclusion
We began this paper with two sets of questions { what is the tracking impact of a crackdown on
illicit activities in the source country if the bargaining position of footloose transnational trackers
hinges on a threat to switch to a domestic buyer source? What about a similar hike in the likelihood
of discovery in the foreign country? Our goal is to contribute to the debate on the coordination
of international eorts to curb transnational tracking, by means of laws that directly act on
the demand side incentives that encourage individuals to engage in tracking. Our theoretical
model shows within the context of a two-way bilateral bargaining problem that the answers to
these questions are nuanced. In particular, crackdowns on illicit employment of tracked victims
in the host and the source countries can be mutually reinforcing, or can counteract one another
depending precisely on middlemen bargaining power, whether trackers enjoy ready access to an
internationally diverse buyer base, and the demand elasticity of the demand for tracked victims.
Based on a novel dataset of international tracking, we empirically ascertained the drivers
of cross-border tracking, including victim protection programs, and law enforcement against
prostitution. Our empirical assessment paid particular attention to the endogeneity of victim
protection legislation, and country specic unobserved heterogeneity. We present results from single
28equation estimates, and instrumental variable estimates using legal origin and settler mortality as
instruments. In both cases, and across a variety of specications, our ndings show that the impacts
of both host and source country legislation prohibiting prostitution on tracking are positive.
These ndings are consistent with an inelastic demand for tracked victims, partial bargaining
power of trackers, and considerable ease of access across domestic and foreign markets.
In terms of the debate concerning whether a heightened likelihood of discovery in illicit ser-
vice sectors can stem the tide of transnational tracking, these ndings lend support to the view
that with inelastic demand, heightened enforcement in the host country can raise the willingness
to pay for tracked victims in the host country, thus encouraging transnational tracking. Mean-
while, with partial bargaining power, and considerable ease of access between domestic and foreign
markets, heightened enforcement in the source country can indeed \play into the hands of criminal
networks" (Bureau of the Dutch National Rapporteur on Tracking 2005), by raising the (threat
point) reservation price of tracked victims, and accordingly the protability of transnational
tracking.
A number of other important questions remain. A key issue raised in this paper is that
domestic and international tracking activities are simultaneously determined. This suggests
not only that domestic legislation can spill over to impact international tracking, but likewise
international enforcement of anti-tracking initiatives can impact domestic tracking activities
as well. This observation naturally suggest the need to empirically ascertain the link between
tracking related policy measures and illicit domestic employment. In addition, the model that
we explored is in fact equally applicable for other forms of illicit international trade such as drugs
and antiquities. Empirical work on these alternative areas where middleman trackers operate
can be equally illuminating.
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Table 1A.  
Effects of   ,   , and    on Transnational Trafficking      -- Sufficiently Inelastic Demand  
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buyer penalty applies regardless of the reason for discovery 
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Table 1B. 
Effects of   ,   , and    on Transnational Trafficking      -- All Other Demand Elasticities  
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Table 2A.   
Effects of   ,   , and    on Transnational Trafficking      -- Sufficiently Inelastic Demand  
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buyer penalty applies regardless of the reason for discovery 
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Table 2B. 
Effects of   ,   , and    on Transnational Trafficking      -- All Other Demand Elasticities  
(  
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buyer penalty applies regardless of the reason for discovery 
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    1   Neg., Neg., Pos.  Neg., Neg., Pos. 
 
   
 
Table 3A. 
Effects of   ,   , and    on Transnational Trafficking    -- Sufficiently Inelastic Demand  
(  
   0 ,   
   0,   , ),  
buyer penalty applies either regardless of the reason for discovery, or only through law enforcement 
    
 /  
          
 /  
       
    1   Pos., Pos., Neg.  Pos., Pos., Neg. 
   ∈  0 , 1     Pos., Pos., Neg.  Pos., Pos., Pos. 
  
Table 3B. 
Effects of   ,   , and    on Transnational Trafficking    -- Elastic Demand  
(  
   0 ,    
   0 ,     
   0 ),   
buyer penalty applies either regardless of the reason for discovery, or only through law enforcement 
 
    
 /  
          
 /  
       
    1   Neg., Neg., Pos.  Neg., Neg., Pos. 
   ∈  0 , 1     Neg., Neg., Pos.   Neg., Neg., Neg. 
 
Table 3C. 
Effects of   ,   , and    on Transnational Trafficking    -- Intermediate Demand Elasticity  
(  
   0 ,    
   0 ,     
   0 ),  
buyer penalty applies regardless of the reason for discovery 
     
 /  
          
 /  
       
    1   Neg., Neg., Pos.  Neg., Neg., Pos. 
   ∈  0 , 1     Neg., Neg., Pos.   Neg., Neg., Neg. 
 
Table 3D. 
Effects of   ,   , and    on Transnational Trafficking    – Intermediate Demand Elasticity  
(  
   0 ,    
   0 ,     
   0 ),  
buyer penalty applies only through law enforcement 
    
 /  
          
 /  
       
    1   Pos., Neg., Pos.  Pos., Neg., Pos. 
   ∈  0 , 1     Pos., Neg., Pos.  Pos., Neg., Neg. 
  
 
   
 
Table 4. List of Countries and Status of Trafficking 
Non Host  Hub  Source 
Andorra Antigua  Afghanistan  Poland Algeria 
Bahamas Australia  Albania  Romania  Angola 
Barbados Austria  Argentina Russian  Fed.  Armenia 
Burundi Belgium  Bahrain  Senegal  Azerbaijan 
Comoros Belize  Bangladesh  Slovakia  Belarus 
Croatia  Bosnia & Herzegovina  Benin  South Africa  Bhutan 
Djibouti Botswana  Brazil  South  Korea  Bolivia 
Egypt  Canada  Brunei  Sri Lanka  Cape Verde 
Eritrea  Central African  Rep.  Bulgaria  Sudan  Colombia 
Fiji Chile  Burkina  Faso  Taiwan  Cuba 
Iceland  Cote d'Ivoire  Cambodia  Tanzania  Ecuador 
Jamaica Denmark  Cameroon  TFYR  Macedonia  Estonia 
Lesotho Finland  Chad  Thailand  Ethiopia 
Liechtenstein France China Togo Georgia 
Luxembourg  Gabon  Congo, Dem. Rep.  Turkey  Guyana 
Maldives Gambia  Costa  Rica  Uganda  Honduras 
Malta Germany  Cyprus  Ukraine  Iraq 
Marshall Islands  Greece  Czech Republic  Uzbekistan  Kenya 
Micronesia  Hong Kong (SAR)  Dominican Rep.  Venezuela  Latvia 
Monaco  Israel El  Salvador  Vietnam  Madagascar 
Namibia Italy  Equatorial  Guinea  Zimbabwe  Malawi 
Nauru Japan  Ghana      Mauritania 
New Zealand  Kuwait  Guatemala     Moldova 
Niue Lebanon  Haiti      Morocco 
Oman Libya  Hungary      Mozambique 
Palau Macau  (SAR)  India      Nepal 
Palestine  Mauritius  Indonesia     Nicaragua 
Papua New Guinea  Netherlands  Iran     Sierra Leone 
Paraguay Norway  Kazakhstan      Slovenia 
Saint Kitts and Nevis  Portugal  Kosovo     Somalia 
Saint Lucia  Qatar  Kyrgyzstan     Tajikistan 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines Rwanda  Laos      Zambia 
Samoa Saudi  Arabia  Liberia        
San Marino  Singapore  Lithuania       
Sao Tome and and Principe  Spain  Malaysia       
Seychelles Suriname  Mali        
Solomon Islands  Swaziland  Mexico       
Tonga Sweden  Mongolia        
Trinidad and Tobago  Switzerland  Myanmar       
Tunisia Syria  Niger        
Turkmenistan United  Arab Emirates  Nigeria       
Tuvalu United  Kingdom  Pakistan        
Uruguay United  States  Panama        
Vanatu Yemen  Peru        
   Yugoslavia  Philippines       
  
 
Table 5.  Legislative, Economic, Demographic and Labor Force Characteristics 
 
   Non Host Hub Source  All 
   (19%) (25%) (38%) (18%) (100%) 
Grants Legal Status/Amnesty to trafficked victims  0.0%  22.2%  6.2% 0.0% 7.6% 
Prohibits prostitution  39.0% 35.6% 41.5% 34.4% 38.3% 
Employment in Ag (% of total)  12.58 5.53  26.90 25.10 17.90 
Population Density (people per  sq)  167.41 279.98 119.88 55.37  156.52 
Mortality Rate (under 5 per 1000)  41.68  36.90  80.73 96.69 64.74 
Literacy Rate (% of population) 84.90  82.17  77.42 77.28 79.32 
Female Unemployment Rate  13.84 7.55  11.15 11.93 10.24 
Male Unemployment Rate  9.26 5.95 9.43 11.25  8.38 
















































Legal origins – French  40.0% 46.5% 42.6% 45.1% 43.6% 
Legal origins - German  0.0% 9.3% 1.6% 0.0% 3.03% 
Legal origins - British  53.3% 32.5% 27.8% 25.8% 33.3% 
Legal origins - Socialist  0.0% 2.3% 27.8%  29.0%  17.0% 
Legal origins - Scandinavian  3.3% 9.3% 0.0% 0.0% 3.03% 













































Probability of Trafficking – Probit Marginal Effect Estimates  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Host country grants amnesty 0.057** 0.011** 0.011** 0.0077*** 0.015** 0.0096***
 (0.027) (0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0026) (0.0070) (0.0031)
Host country prostitution laws 0.0015 0.0012 0.00084 0.00035 0.00022 0.000080
 (0.0054) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.00085) (0.0019) (0.00090)
Host country log GDP per capita 0.0037* 0.0025* 0.0013***  0.0036** 0.0016***
 (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.00043)  (0.0017) (0.00042)
Host country is a transition economy -0.0038*** -0.0020***  -0.0059*** -0.0027***
 (0.0011) (0.00021)  (0.0016) (0.00029)
Host country is land locked  -0.0027** -0.0013*** -0.0042** -0.0018***
 (0.0010) (0.00034)  (0.0019) (0.00053)
Source country prostitution laws 0.0049 0.0030 0.0018 0.00071 0.0029 0.0012
 (0.0062) (0.0034) (0.0024) (0.00073) (0.0038) (0.00081)
Source country log GDP per capita  -0.0029* -0.0029** -0.0013***  -0.0030* -0.00097**
 (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.00032)  (0.0016) (0.00049)
Source country is a transition economy 0.017*** 0.028***  0.017*** 0.046**
 (0.0048) (0.0077)  (0.0057) (0.023)
Source country is land locked -0.0030 -0.0014**  -0.0041 -0.0014
 (0.0019) (0.00064)  (0.0032) (0.00089)
Host and source are in the same region  0.0042 0.0070 0.0026** 0.0093 0.0030*
 (0.0054) (0.0043) (0.0013)  (0.0064) (0.0018)
Host and source share a border 0.041* 0.039 0.026* 0.038* 0.022***
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.014)  (0.020) (0.0084)
Distance ('000 km)  -0.0016** -0.00098*** -0.00072*** -0.0014*** -0.00099***
 (0.00064) (0.00024) (0.000098)  (0.00037) (0.00015)
Source country lies in EAP  0.15***    0.26***
  (0.018)   (0.053)
Source country lies in ECA  0.017***    0.011**
  (0.0037)   (0.0051)
Source country lies in MENA  0.0080***    0.0060
  (0.0025)   (0.0038)
Source country lies in South Asia  0.13***    0.16***
  (0.022)   (0.049)
Source country lies in SSA  0.029***    0.037***
  (0.0078)   (0.014)
Source country lies in LAC  0.059***    0.084***
  (0.011)   (0.022)
Host country political stability -0.00094 -0.00073**
  (0.00093) (0.00030)
Host country voice and accountability -0.00093 -0.00029
  (0.0017) (0.00063)
Host country rule of law  0.00087 0.00055
  (0.0025) (0.00095)
Source country political stability 0.00083 -0.0015*
  (0.0027) (0.00089)
Source country voice and accountability 0.00059 -0.00018
  (0.0022) (0.00069)
Source country rule of law  -0.0042* 0.000063
  (0.0024) (0.0016)
Observations 30,940 26,560 26,560 26,560 18,358 18,358
Pseudo R-squared 0.043 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.25 0.31
Log likelihood  -2757 -2081 -1975 -1866  -1734 -1604
Notes: a) Standard errors in parentheses allow for inter-regional correlations b) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Instrumental variable estimates of the probability of trafficking – Selected marginal effects 
(standard errors) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
Host country grants amnesty 0.23 0.010 0.022 0.017 0.033 0.027
 (0.15) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012) (0.023) (0.020)
Host country prostitution laws 0.0053 0.0010 0.0015 0.00074 0.0015 0.00072
 (0.0060) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.00087) (0.0018) (0.00067)
Source country prostitution laws 0.0078 0.0046 0.0024 0.0010 0.0023 0.00088
 (0.0096) (0.0054) (0.0033) (0.00068) (0.0030) (0.00055)
Generalized residual  -0.034 0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0034 -0.0021
 (0.021) (0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0013) (0.0027) (0.0014)
Observations 17,293 17,293 17,293 17,293 17,293 17,293
Notes: a) Standard errors allow for intra-regional correlations b) Legal origin is used as an instrumental variable c) The full set of regressors 
in each of the six specifications is the same as those reported in columns 1 to 6 of Table 6 d) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 7b 
Instrumental variable estimates of the probability of trafficking – Selected marginal effects  
(standard errors) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Host country grants amnesty 0.13*** 0.047* 0.054* 0.0076** 0.055* 0.0067
 (0.045) (0.026) (0.029) (0.0037) (0.031) (0.0045)
Host country prostitution laws  0.012** 0.0052 0.0045 0.00028** 0.0043 0.00026***
 (0.0059) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.00014) (0.0031) (0.000095)
Source country prostitution laws 0.0048 0.0048 0.0030 0.00014* 0.0028 0.00015***
 (0.0071) (0.0042) (0.0031) (0.000082) (0.0027) (0.000045)
Generalized residual  -0.019*** -0.0037 -0.0040 -0.00016 -0.0040 -0.00014
 (0.0067) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.00017) (0.0031) (0.00018)
Observations 8,905 8,905 8,905 8,905 8,905 8,905
Notes: a) Standard errors allow for intra-regional correlations b) Settler mortality is used as an instrumental variable c) The full set of 
regressors in each of the six specifications is the same as those reported in columns 1 to 6 of Table 6 d) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 7c 
Instrumental variable estimates of the probability of trafficking – Selected marginal effects  
(standard errors) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Host country grants amnesty 0.13*** 0.077** 0.081** 0.013** 0.081* 0.012*
 (0.051) (0.037) (0.040) (0.0062) (0.043) (0.0062)
Host country prostitution laws  0.012** 0.0056 0.0046 0.00031** 0.0044 0.00027***
 (0.0058) (0.0039) (0.0033) (0.00015) (0.0033) (0.000088)
Source country prostitution laws 0.0048 0.0047 0.0029 0.00014* 0.0027 0.00015***
 (0.0070) (0.0041) (0.0029) (0.000079) (0.0026) (0.000040)
Generalized residual  -0.024** -0.0085* -0.0074* -0.00036* -0.0072 -0.00030*
 (0.0097) (0.0050) (0.0044) (0.00022) (0.0046) (0.00018)
Observations 8,905 8,905 8,905 8,905 8,905 8,905
Notes: a) Standard errors allow for intra-regional correlations b) Legal origin and settler mortality are used as instrumental variables c) The 









  Appendix Table 1 
Probability of Trafficking – Probit Marginal Effect Estimates 
Including Host Country Values 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)
Host country grants amnesty 0.0077*** 0.0075*** 0.017*** 0.0043*** 0.0039***
 (0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0049) (0.0016)  (0.0015)
Host country prostitution laws 0.00035 0.00065 0.00016 0.00022 0.00018
 (0.00085) (0.00079) (0.0017) (0.00020)  (0.00016)
Host country log GDP per capita  0.0013*** 0.00099*** 0.0013*** 0.00015*** 0.00015***
 (0.00043) (0.00026) (0.00039) (0.000036)  (0.000031)
Host country is a transition economy -0.0020*** -0.0021*** -0.0057***  
 (0.00021) (0.00047) (0.00078)  
Host country is land locked  -0.0013*** -0.0018*** -0.0024*** -0.00023* -0.00019
 (0.00034) (0.00053) (0.00044) (0.00013)  (0.00013)
Source country prostitution laws 0.00071 0.00053 0.0014 0.00012 0.00012
 (0.00073) (0.00053) (0.0014) (0.00011)  (0.00011)
Source country log GDP per capita -0.0013*** -0.0011*** -0.0016*** -0.00023*** -0.00024***
 (0.00032) (0.00032) (0.00020) (0.000051)  (0.000049)
Source country is a transition economy 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.81*** 0.81***
 (0.0077) (0.0067) (0.0040) (0.019)  (0.018)
Source country is land locked  -0.0014** -0.0012** -0.0016*** -0.00027*** -0.00027***
 (0.00064) (0.00051) (0.00048) (0.000092)  (0.000090)
Host and source are in the same region 0.0026** 0.0029* 0.0054** 0.0014** 0.0013**
 (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0025) (0.00060)  (0.00050)
Host and source share a border 0.026* 0.027** 0.028*** 0.0077 0.0078
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.0091) (0.0052)  (0.0057)
Distance ('000 km)  -0.00072*** -0.00062*** -0.00090*** -0.000086*** -0.000088***
 (0.000098) (0.00014) (0.00016) (0.000011)  (0.000010)
Source country lies in EAP  0.15*** 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.98*** 0.98***
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.021) (0.0095)  (0.0095)
Source country lies in ECA  0.017*** 0.020*** 0.030*** 0.0070 0.0061*
 (0.0037) (0.0052) (0.0053) (0.0043)  (0.0034)
Source country lies in MENA  0.0080*** 0.0092*** 0.011** 0.91*** 0.90***
 (0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0044) (0.042)  (0.038)
Source country lies in South Asia 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.99*** 0.99***
 (0.022) (0.034) (0.023) (0.0042)  (0.0048)
Source country lies in SSA  0.029*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.75*** 0.73***
 (0.0078) (0.0098) (0.0044) (0.055)  (0.056)
Source country lies in LAC  0.059*** 0.061*** 0.080*** 0.90*** 0.90***
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.036)  (0.038)
Host country has French legal origin  -0.00024   -0.00028*
 (0.00043)   (0.00016)
Host country has German legal origin  0.0022  
 (0.0019)  
Host country distaste for foreign neighbors 0.0068  
 (0.0059)  
Host country – justifiability of prostitution -0.00021  
 (0.00044)  
Mortality 3.2e-07***  3.0e-07***
  (1.0e-07) (9.2e-08)
Observations 26,560 24,649 10,458 11,620 11,620
Pseudo R-squared 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.32
Log likelihood  -1866 -1747 -903 -690  -685






  Appendix Table 2 
Probability of Trafficking – Probit Marginal Effect Estimates 
Excluding East Africa 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)
Host country grants amnesty 0.059** 0.011** 0.011** 0.0078*** 0.016** 0.0095***
 (0.028) (0.0043) (0.0052) (0.0028) (0.0072) (0.0032)
Host country prostitution laws 0.0013 0.0011 0.00075 0.00031 0.00022 0.000078
 (0.0057) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.00084) (0.0020) (0.00088)
Host country log GDP per capita 0.0036** 0.0024* 0.0012***  0.0035** 0.0015***
 (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.00046)  (0.0017) (0.00046)
Host country is a transition economy -0.0039*** -0.0020***  -0.0061*** -0.0028***
 (0.0011) (0.00025)  (0.0017) (0.00030)
Host country is land locked  -0.0026*** -0.0013*** -0.0043** -0.0018***
 (0.0010) (0.00036)  (0.0020) (0.00053)
Source country prostitution laws 0.0056 0.0033 0.0020 0.00086 0.0026 0.0011
 (0.0064) (0.0034) (0.0024) (0.00062) (0.0036) (0.00081)
Source country log GDP per capita  -0.0032** -0.0030** -0.0012***  -0.0033* -0.00093
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.00036)  (0.0020) (0.00057)
Source country is a transition economy 0.015*** 0.025***  0.017*** 0.044*
 (0.0045) (0.0080)  (0.0062) (0.023)
Source country is land locked -0.0027 -0.0013**  -0.0042 -0.0012
 (0.0017) (0.00064)  (0.0035) (0.00093)
Host and source are in the same region  0.0046 0.0076* 0.0030* 0.010 0.0035
 (0.0057) (0.0046) (0.0017)  (0.0073) (0.0023)
Host and source share a border 0.040* 0.038 0.026* 0.038* 0.021**
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.014)  (0.020) (0.0086)
Distance ('000 km)  -0.0015** -0.00094*** -0.00067*** -0.0014*** -0.00092***
 (0.00063) (0.00025) (0.00011)  (0.00039) (0.00018)
Source country lies in EAP  0.14***    0.26***
  (0.019)  (0.055)
Source country lies in ECA  0.017***    0.011**
  (0.0037)  (0.0055)
Source country lies in MENA  0.0076***    0.0063
  (0.0025)  (0.0041)
Source country lies in South Asia  0.12***    0.16***
  (0.024)  (0.053)
Source country lies in SSA  0.034***    0.041***
  (0.011)  (0.015)
Source country lies in LAC  0.055***    0.082***
  (0.012)  (0.022)
Host country political stability -0.0011 -0.00077**
  (0.00097) (0.00032)
Host country voice and accountability -0.00062 -0.00012
  (0.0016) (0.00063)
Host country rule of law  0.00091 0.00054
  (0.0026) (0.00096)
Source country political stability 0.00065 -0.0015*
  (0.0026) (0.00090)
Source country voice and accountability 0.00060 -0.00018
  (0.0021) (0.00069)
Source country rule of law  -0.0036 0.00017
  (0.0028) (0.0018)
Observations 29,484 25,232 25,232 25,232 17,673 17,673
Pseudo R-squared 0.044 0.23 0.26 0.30 0.25 0.31
Log likelihood  -2685 -2006 -1908 -1808  -1686 -1557
Notes: a) Standard errors in parentheses allow for inter-regional correlations b) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Appendix Table 3 
Probability of Trafficking – Probit Marginal Effect Estimates 
Excluding West and Central Africa 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)
Host country grants amnesty 0.057* 0.0088** 0.0091** 0.0060*** 0.013** 0.0078***
 (0.029) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0016) (0.0057) (0.0020)
Host country prostitution laws 0.0016 0.0013 0.00096 0.00042 0.00023 0.000072
 (0.0059) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.00097) (0.0022) (0.0010)
Host country log GDP per capita  0.0038** 0.0028** 0.0014*** 0.0043*** 0.0019***
 (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.00023)  (0.0016) (0.00029)
Host country is a transition economy -0.0031*** -0.0016***  -0.0048*** -0.0021***
 (0.00085) (0.00030)  (0.0014) (0.00047)
Host country is land locked -0.0023** -0.0010*  -0.0035* -0.0014**
 (0.0011) (0.00053)  (0.0020) (0.00072)
Source country prostitution laws 0.0060 0.0031 0.0020 0.00086 0.0034 0.0014**
 (0.0064) (0.0034) (0.0025) (0.00058) (0.0040) (0.00063)
Source country log GDP per capita  -0.0028* -0.0027** -0.0010***  -0.0029* -0.00072*
 (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.00022)  (0.0017) (0.00039)
Source country is a transition economy 0.014*** 0.025***  0.013*** 0.036*
 (0.0046) (0.0059)  (0.0048) (0.020)
Source country is land locked -0.0025 -0.00099**  -0.0033 -0.00086
 (0.0017) (0.00048)  (0.0030) (0.00082)
Host and source are in the same region  0.0016 0.0045 0.0012 0.0055 0.0012
 (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.00086)  (0.0050) (0.0012)
Host and source share a border 0.040** 0.039* 0.027**  0.037** 0.021***
 (0.020) (0.023) (0.012)  (0.017) (0.0061)
Distance ('000 km)  -0.0014** -0.00089*** -0.00064*** -0.0014*** -0.00093***
 (0.00059) (0.00025) (0.00011)  (0.00039) (0.00016)
Source country lies in EAP  0.14***    0.23***
  (0.019)  (0.053)
Source country lies in ECA  0.014***    0.0098*
  (0.0027)  (0.0056)
Source country lies in MENA  0.0070***    0.0055
  (0.0024)  (0.0039)
Source country lies in South Asia  0.12***    0.15***
  (0.018)  (0.045)
Source country lies in SSA  0.028***    0.041***
  (0.0047)   (0.014)
Source country lies in LAC  0.055***    0.077***
  (0.0061)   (0.019)
Host country political stability -0.0012 -0.00086*
  (0.0012) (0.00050)
Host country voice and accountability -0.00091 -0.00026
  (0.0017) (0.00064)
Host country rule of law  0.00075 0.00047
  (0.0027) (0.00095)
Source country political stability 0.0020 -0.00100
  (0.0030) (0.00093)
Source country voice and accountability 0.00059 -0.00016
  (0.0028) (0.00089)
Source country rule of law  -0.0052*** -0.00041
  (0.0019) (0.0017)
Observations 28,210 24,070 24,070 24,070 16,440 16,440
Pseudo R-squared 0.048 0.23 0.26 0.31 0.25 0.31
Log likelihood  -2419 -1811 -1728 -1617  -1527 -1404
Notes: a) Standard errors in parentheses allow for inter-regional correlations b) *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  Appendix Table 4 
Probability of Trafficking – Probit Marginal Effect Estimates 
Excluding West, Central and East Africa 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Host country grants amnesty 0.060** 0.0089** 0.0093** 0.0060*** 0.013** 0.0076***
 (0.030) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0017) (0.0058) (0.0021)
Host country prostitution laws 0.0013 0.0011 0.00083 0.00037 0.00021 0.000071
 (0.0062) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.00095) (0.0022) (0.00100)
Host country log GDP per capita  0.0037*** 0.0027** 0.0013*** 0.0042*** 0.0018***
 (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.00025)  (0.0016) (0.00029)
Host country is a transition economy -0.0031*** -0.0016***  -0.0049*** -0.0022***
 (0.00086) (0.00034)  (0.0016) (0.00055)
Host country is land locked -0.0023** -0.0010**  -0.0036* -0.0014**
 (0.0010) (0.00051)  (0.0020) (0.00069)
Source country prostitution laws 0.0068 0.0033 0.0023 0.0011** 0.0031 0.0014**
 (0.0068) (0.0034) (0.0024) (0.00046) (0.0036) (0.00061)
Source country log GDP per capita  -0.0032*** -0.0029** -0.0010***  -0.0032 -0.00061
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.00023)  (0.0022) (0.00044)
Source country is a transition economy 0.012*** 0.021***  0.013** 0.034*
 (0.0040) (0.0059)  (0.0051) (0.020)
Source country is land locked  -0.0022 -0.00081  -0.0035 -0.00065
 (0.0016) (0.00054)  (0.0034) (0.00091)
Host and source are in the same region  0.0019 0.0049 0.0014 0.0063 0.0016
 (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0011)  (0.0056) (0.0016)
Host and source share a border 0.038* 0.038* 0.026** 0.035** 0.020***
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.012)  (0.017) (0.0064)
Distance ('000 km)  -0.0013** -0.00085*** -0.00059*** -0.0013*** -0.00086***
 (0.00056) (0.00025) (0.000093)  (0.00040) (0.00015)
Source country lies in EAP  0.13***    0.23***
  (0.016)  (0.058)
Source country lies in ECA  0.015***    0.010
  (0.0033)  (0.0065)
Source country lies in MENA  0.0066***    0.0059
  (0.0022)  (0.0045)
Source country lies in South Asia  0.11***    0.15***
  (0.019)  (0.053)
Source country lies in SSA  0.035***    0.045***
  (0.0064)   (0.017)
Source country lies in LAC  0.052***    0.074***
  (0.0060)   (0.020)
Host country political stability -0.0013 -0.00088
  (0.0013) (0.00054)
Host country voice and accountability -0.00055 -0.000070
  (0.0017) (0.00067)
Host country rule of law  0.00074 0.00043
  (0.0028) (0.00094)
Source country political stability 0.0017 -0.0010
  (0.0028) (0.00090)
Source country voice and accountability 0.00055 -0.00014
  (0.0028) (0.00094)
Source country rule of law  -0.0045 -0.00043
  (0.0027) (0.0019)
Observations 26,754 22,742 22,742 22,742 15,755 15,755
Pseudo R-squared 0.050 0.24 0.27 0.31 0.26 0.32
Log likelihood  -2347 -1733 -1662 -1562  -1479  -1358





 Appendix Table 5 
First stage probit estimates 
VARIABLES Host  country 
grants amnesty 




Host country prostitution laws  -0.068 -1.69***  -3.26***
 (0.045) (0.12)  (0.19)
Host country log GDP per capita  0.68*** 1.48***  2.39***
 (0.039) (0.11)  (0.14)
Host country is a transition economy 1.39***
 (0.079)
Host country is land locked  -0.21***
 (0.060)
Host country political stability 0.23*** 0.39**  3.02***
 (0.064) (0.17)  (0.30)
Host country voice and accountability 0.91*** 1.08*** 1.94***
 (0.059) (0.10)  (0.13)
Host country rule of law  -0.73*** -1.83*** -5.49***
 (0.079) (0.19)  (0.39)
Source country prostitution laws  -0.0093 -0.017  -0.023
 (0.041) (0.080)  (0.083)
Source country log GDP per capita  0.0048 0.011  0.016
 (0.025) (0.048)  (0.050)
Source country is a transition economy 0.012 -0.0010 -0.0050
 (0.21) (0.42)  (0.44)
Source country is land locked  0.0061 0.037  0.053
 (0.047) (0.093)  (0.096)
Source country political stability -0.0058 -0.0059  -0.0067
 (0.044) (0.086)  (0.089)
Source country voice and accountability -0.00081 -0.012 -0.018
 (0.034) (0.067)  (0.069)
Source country rule of law  0.0069 0.016  0.021
 (0.057) (0.11)  (0.11)
Host and source are in the same region -0.25*** -1.16***  -1.32***
 (0.063) (0.15)  (0.15)
Host and source share a border  0.29** 0.19  0.16
 (0.13) (0.32)  (0.32)
Distance ('000 km)  -0.018*** -0.10*** -0.14***
 (0.0055) (0.010)  (0.012)
Source country lies in EAP  0.10 0.54***  0.69***
 (0.095) (0.17)  (0.17)
Source country lies in ECA  -0.0085 -0.0050  -0.019
 (0.22) (0.43)  (0.45)
Source country lies in MENA  0.0089 0.098  0.082
 (0.088) (0.17)  (0.18)
Source country lies in South Asia  0.038 0.22  0.31
 (0.14) (0.26)  (0.27)
Source country lies in SSA  0.027 0.10  0.11
 (0.097) (0.18)  (0.19)
Source country lies in LAC  0.071 0.24  0.25
 (0.085) (0.16)  (0.17)
Host country has French legal origin  0.77*** -2.20***
 (0.055) (0.19)
Host country has German legal origin 0.53***
 (0.068)
Settler mortality -0.045***  -0.044***
 (0.0042)  (0.0042)
Constant -8.03*** -12.0***  -18.5***
 (0.40) (1.05)  (1.25)
Observations 17,293 8,905  8,905
Notes: a) Standard errors allow for intra-regional correlations. b) Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 